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Children and the Law:
Constitutional Decisionmaking and the
“Peculiar Vulnerability of Children”
Lois A. Weithorn1
In 2016, in the juvenile sentencing case of Montgomery v.
Louisiana,2 the U.S. Supreme Court remarked that “children are
constitutionally different from adults.” Few would disagree with the
notion that children differ from adults in many ways. At times, courts
have determined that those differences justify—indeed require—
differential treatment of children and adults under the Constitution.
In its decisions, the Court has identified “three reasons” for treating
children differently under the Constitution. It has cited “the peculiar
vulnerability of children; [children’s] inability to make critical decisions
in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role
in child rearing.”3 While much attention has been paid in recent decades
to the latter two factors, there has been comparatively little analysis of
how notions of children’s vulnerability relate to constitutional
decisionmaking. Here, I focus attention on the concept of children’s
vulnerability, examples of which abound in constitutional jurisprudence,
despite the absence of substantial discussion of its meaning, parameters,
and relevance to constitutional decisionmaking.
Characterizations of children as vulnerable (or not) are assertions
about aspects of the psychological or physiological nature of children
that are endorsed or rejected by judges. As such, they represent the
judicial conclusions about certain facts relevant to constitutional cases.
Because these vulnerability constructs concern general phenomena (that
is, characteristics, needs, or responses to certain situations, stimuli, or
influences of children generally) rather than information specific to the
parties in the litigation, the constructs have been referred to as legislative
facts4 when judges offer them as reflecting the true state of the world.
What should be the source of the “facts” about children’s
development (or any phenomenon relating to human behavior or

1. Summarized and excerpted from Lois A. Weithorn, A Constitutional
Jurisprudence of Children’s Vulnerability, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 179 (2017).
2. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733 (2016); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 68 (2010).
3. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (emphasis added).
4. David L. Faigman, Normative Constitutional Factfinding, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
541, 552 (1991).
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functioning) used by judges in resolving constitutional questions?
Ideally, when assertions about children’s functioning in the real world
are employed in analyzing and deciding a case, courts’ formulations
about children’s characteristics should be consistent with the state of
knowledge in developmental psychology and other relevant health
science fields. While constitutional cases must be resolved through
application of constitutional principles, if a court integrates legislative
“facts” relating to children’s vulnerability into its analyses—as it often
does when scrutinizing state purposes asserted to justify child-protective
legislation—those facts must reflect the best available knowledge
regarding children’s functioning and development.
Here, I first set out what is meant by children’s vulnerability and
then offer a taxonomy of subtypes of vulnerability relevant to legal
decisionmaking. In so doing, I provide a range of examples of how the
courts have employed constructs of children’s vulnerability in
constitutional decisionmaking. Finally, I emphasize the importance of
legal decisionmakers relying on empirically supported and evidencebased notions of children’s vulnerability, where possible, rather than on
assumptions about children’s functioning drawn from everyday
experiences.
What is Meant by Children’s Vulnerability?
The Supreme Court has provided only limited explanation of the
meanings it ascribes to the concept of vulnerability. For instance, it has
never explained its choice of the modifier “peculiar” in describing
children’s vulnerability in Bellotti v. Baird, although we might assume
the Court is suggesting distinctiveness and atypicality. Some features of
children’s vulnerability are indeed distinctive, such as those related to the
natural patterns and pace of the physiological and psychological changes
children undergo throughout their development, or to the unique role of
parents in minor children’s lives.
The terms “vulnerable” and “vulnerability” are used in everyday
parlance as well as in jurisprudence and scholarship. Yet there is
remarkably little written to elucidate the nature of the concept as it
relates to human beings. One dictionary defines the term “vulnerable” as
“capable of or susceptible to being wounded or hurt physically or
emotionally” or “susceptible to temptation or corrupt influence.”5 These
two threads—susceptibility to physical or emotional harm and
5. Vulnerable, THE RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY (2d ed.
1997).

2018]

The Judges’ Book

7

susceptibility to coercion or other external sources of influence—also sit
at the core of many philosophical, scientific, and legal formulations.
Other concepts of vulnerability, such as those relating to immature
decisionmaking capacities, dependence on others, or socially imposed
restrictions on freedom, also appear in scholarly literature and
jurisprudence relating to childhood.
I developed the following five categories of vulnerability through
review and analysis of constitutional decisions rendered by the federal
courts and the relevant legal, scientific, and philosophical scholarship.
Examples of how concepts within these categories influence
constitutional decisions will be provided below.
(1) Harm-Based Vulnerability (that is, vulnerability as greater
susceptibility to physical or psychological harm from
exposure to certain stimuli or situations);
(2) Influence-Based Vulnerability (that is, vulnerability as
greater susceptibility to influence, pressure, coercion by
others);
(3) Capacity-Based Vulnerability (that is, vulnerability arising
from immature decisional and self-protective capacities);
(4) Status-Based Vulnerability (that is, vulnerability arising from
legal, social, and situational concomitants of minority status
and subordination to the authority and control of others); and
(5) Dependency-Based Vulnerability (that is, vulnerability
arising from greater dependence or reliance on others to
meet one’s basic needs).
Harm-based vulnerability is one of the most common constructs
invoked to support treating children differently from adults under the
Constitution. Concerned about the “crippling” effects of child labor, the
Supreme Court underscored that a state’s parens patriae and police
power interests in children’s welfare can serve as the basis for restriction
of others’ constitutional rights.6 The dangers to the “physical and
psychological well-being” of children, who are perceived as manifesting
“particular” vulnerability, are cited to justify the criminalization of a

6.

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 161 (1944).
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range of activities related to child pornography.7 Courts have relied on
notions of children’s vulnerability in determining the constitutionality of
courtroom procedures that accommodate children as courtroom
witnesses against alleged abusers and in considering the constitutionality
of limiting children’s access to reading matter, media, or games asserted
to be sexually explicit or extremely violent and therefore inappropriate
for children’s consumption.
Harm-based vulnerability constructs also appear in the Supreme
Court’s adolescent abortion cases. The majority in H.L. v. Matheson
asserted that the “emotional and psychological effects of the pregnancy
and abortion experience are markedly more severe in girls under 18 than
in adults,”8 while dissenters focused on the special risks to minors of
being forced to continue with an unwanted pregnancy and childbirth.9
Images of children as susceptible to harm have also been employed in
equal-protection cases to emphasize the risks to children of unequal
treatment. In Brown v. Board of Education, the Court stated that “[t]o
separate [Black children] from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”10
Race-based decisionmaking was rejected in Palmore v. Sidoti, where the
Court determined that assertions about children’s vulnerability to “social
stigmatization” would not influence its decision, holding that race-based
factors such as these were not constitutionally permissible considerations
in determining custody of a child.11 More recently, in expanding
constitutional protections for the marital rights of same-sex couples, the
Court cited the “harm and humiliat[ion]” experienced by the children of
same-sex couples who do not understand why their families are treated
as “less worthy” of formal recognition under the law.12
Concepts of children’s influence-based vulnerability appeared in
Supreme Court decisions as early as 1960s. The Court has relied on
notions of children as susceptible to the influence of peers, teachers, and
the government in cases involving Establishment Clause challenges to
policies allowing school prayer. The Court has cited developmental

7. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 & 776 (1982) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
8. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 412-13 (1981).
9. Id. at 438-39 n.38, 444 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
10. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
12. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600-01 (2015); United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013).
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research to support its conclusion that children could not be expected to
flout social expectations and “peer-group norms” that favored
participation in the religious exercises. Even minors on the verge of
adulthood may be susceptible to pressures from peers and authority
figures, according to a 1992 opinion by the Court,13 although Justice
Scalia rejected the assertion that older minors, such as graduating high
school seniors, are susceptible to “psychological coercion” in such
situations.14 Concerns about children’s impressionability and
susceptibility to peer pressure were also cited by the Court in striking
down a Louisiana statute requiring the teaching of “creation science”
whenever evolution is taught.15
In a series of decisions concerning the constitutionality of imposing
the death penalty or life without parole on juvenile offenders, the Court
has invoked a number of constructs relating to children’s vulnerability.
In Roper v. Simmons, holding imposition of the death penalty to be
categorically unconstitutional for persons who committed their crimes as
minors, the Court concluded that “juveniles are more vulnerable or
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer
pressure.”16 These assertions were employed again to extend Roper’s
reasoning in subsequent sentencing cases.17 The Court applied similar
constructs in determining that children are more likely to feel pressured
and to submit when adults “would feel free to go” in determining the
standard for judging whether the interrogation of juveniles is custodial,
triggering police obligation to provide Miranda warnings.18
The concept of capacity-based vulnerability focuses on the risks to
one’s welfare that may accompany immature decisional capacities.
Those with limited capacities may be less able to protect themselves
from potential harms or dangers because they are less likely to perceive
and understand relevant information, to weigh risks and benefits, to
exercise planning, to employ forethought and deliberative
decisionmaking, and to use self-restraint against impulsive action.
Indeed, these are characteristics identified by the Supreme Court in the
juvenile cases involving sentencing and police interrogation cited above.
The Court observed that “children characteristically lack the capacity to
exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete ability to
13. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 578 (1992).
14. Id. at 636-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
15. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987).
16. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
17. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
18. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 269-70 (2011).
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understand the world around them.”19
In Parham v. J.R., a case considering what due process protections
are required before children are “voluntarily” admitted to psychiatric
hospitals with parental consent, Justice Burger opined: “Most children,
even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments
concerning many decisions, including their need for medical care or
treatment.”20 In the context of abortion, the Supreme Court’s majority
opined that minors “often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment
to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.”21
Focusing on minors who engage in criminal offending, the Court in
Roper asserted that minors lacked maturity and were more likely than
adults to engage in “impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions”
and are “overrepresented statistically in virtually every category of
reckless behavior.”22 In Miller, relying on scientific research, the Court
emphasized that “adolescent brains are not yet fully mature in regions
and systems related to higher-order executive functions such as impulse
control, planning ahead, and risk avoidance” and concluded that
“transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess
consequences” reduced minors’ moral culpability for the criminal acts in
which they may engage, thus making the harshest punishments less
appropriate.23
Status-based vulnerability arises from legal, social, and situational
concomitants of minority status and subordination to the authority and
control of others. This form of vulnerability therefore addresses the
structural effects of being subject to the authority of others. Our society
and the law governing family relations are structured so that parents are
authorized to exercise substantial discretion in most areas of children’s
upbringing—with some limited state involvement. Ideally, adults with
such authority act to promote the child’s and society’s interests.
Occasionally, however, the broad grant of parental authority, may be
viewed as detrimental to children. For example, in Troxel v. Granville,
Justice Stevens argued that the Court’s high level of deference to
parental preferences in determining the parameters of court-ordered
third-party visitation of children by grandparents disregarded the
children’s liberty interest in maintaining family bonds.24 As such, he
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 273.
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979).
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470-72 (2012).
530 U.S. 57, 88-90 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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recognized the vulnerability of children to emotional losses from the
severing of such bonds. In a dissent in Wisconsin v. Yoder, a case in
which the Court recognized the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
of Amish parents to remove their teenaged children from public school
earlier than the statutorily determined age of school exit, Justice Douglas
bemoaned the losses to the children of irreplaceable educational
opportunities resulting from their lack of freedom to choose whether to
remain in school.25
In Roper, the Court characterized minors as more vulnerable than
adults “in part by the prevailing circumstance that juveniles have less
control, or less experience with control, over their own environment.”26
In Miller, the Court highlighted the powerlessness of the offenders to
escape the violent home situations in which they were living,
acknowledging that children are less able to extricate themselves from
home and community situations that promote and reinforce criminal
conduct.27 In Schall v. Martin, Justice Burger analogized minors’ lack of
day-to-day control over their lives to institutional detention in defending
less stringent due-process protections in the context of pretrial preventive
detention for minors versus adults, in stating that “juveniles, unlike
adults, are always in some form of custody.”28
Finally, the concept of dependency-based vulnerability recognizes the
implicit reliance of children upon others to meet their most basic needs.
Minors of different ages manifest varying levels of capacity to meet their
own basic needs. While an infant is incapable of even the most basic selfcare, teens can feed, clothe, and bathe themselves, even if some may be
thought not to make the best choices in executing those tasks. Needs for
material sustenance are, of course, fundamental to survival. Needs for
protection from dangers—such as knives, poisons, traffic, loaded
firearms—are also fundamental to survival. Yet as decades of
developmental research confirms, children also have psychological needs
to be nurtured and loved, to be educated and intellectually stimulated, and
to be protected from a range of abusive or brutal practices detrimental to
adaptive human development. In contrast to status-based vulnerability,
which focuses on vulnerabilities due primarily to the structural status
relationships, dependency-based analyses focus on children’s needs and
vulnerabilities arising out of their functional biological and psychological
reliance on others to meet those needs.
25. 406 U.S. 205, 245-46 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
26. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
27. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 477 (2012).
28. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 163 (1984).
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An illustration can be found in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services.29 Joshua DeShaney suffered permanent
brain damage as a result of brutal abuse by his father. Concerned parties
reported suspicions of abuse to the Department of Social Service
(“DSS”), which repeatedly failed to protect Joshua. The Court did not
dispute the general premise that a young child is totally dependent upon
the quality of care provided by those entrusted with protecting his
welfare. However, the majority and dissent diverged on the question of
who owed Joshua a duty of care in light of his total dependence on
adults. The majority concluded that, at least under the federal
Constitution, no duty of care obliged the state to intercede to protect
Joshua; duties of care and protection are born solely by the family as a
private entity. The dissent characterized Joshua as a dependent of the
state, once the state had begun to rescue, consistent with the policies and
procedures of its child-protection apparatus. Dependency-based
vulnerability constructs do not appear frequently in the Supreme Court’s
constitutional cases. The majority’s analysis and resolution of DeShaney
may explain why. Our Constitution is generally viewed as protecting
individuals from government action, rather than bestowing positive rights
to governmental assistance or services. Constitutional challenges,
particularly after DeShaney, are less likely to characterize matters
addressing government’s role in meeting the needs of dependent persons
as falling within the purview of the Constitution.
Children’s Vulnerability, the Courts, and the
Current State of Knowledge
One need not resort to scientific sources to observe that most
children have not yet reached typical adult levels of physiological and
psychological development on most dimensions relevant to the
vulnerability typology proposed above. Although age eighteen is a
relatively crude and often inaccurate point of demarcation for the
acquisition of the legal and social status of adulthood, general differences
between children and adults exist. And the Court’s conclusions in the
cases described indicate just how challenging it can be to try to apply the
general concept of “children are different” to the specific questions about
children’s development and functioning relevant to the cases. The
questions are complicated further in the context of constitutional
decisionmaking by the need to determine whether identified differences

29. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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are sufficiently trustworthy, consistent, or meaningful to justify the
differential treatment required by state or federal legislation or
regulation, or by those who petition the Court claiming that the
Constitution requires such differential treatment where the law fails to
provide it.
As noted above, constitutional cases must be resolved through
application of constitutional principles. Yet if the doctrine requires courts
to integrates legislative “facts” relating to children’s vulnerability into its
analyses—as it often does when scrutinizing state purposes asserted to
justify child protective legislation—those facts must come from
somewhere. One approach by courts is to rely on ordinary human
experience and to assume that the phenomena of interest are easily
discerned by all. And where there is a dearth of empirical research
addressing a question about children’s vulnerability, or any other aspect
of children’s functioning relevant to a court’s decision, a court may have
no choice but to fall back on “common sense” and the life experiences of
the decisionmakers. Yet because the specific nature and degree of the
differences between adults and children on constitutionally relevant
questions raise empirical questions, just resolutions will be promoted
where decisionmaking is informed by the best available developmental
research.
In the context of constitutional decisionmaking about children’s
vulnerability, there exist some excellent examples of courts’
consumption of relevant developmental science. In a Confrontation
Clause case, Maryland v. Craig, the Supreme Court relied heavily on a
strong body of psychological evidence in determining the
constitutionality of allowing child abuse victims to testify via one-way
closed-circuit television rather than in the presence of the defendant,
pursuant to a Maryland statute. The statute required individualized
determinations by the trial court judge as to whether requiring incourtroom testimony by the child would cause “serious emotional
distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate.”30 The Court
held that the modifications permitted by the statute were necessary to
further an important state interest, that is, the protection of the physical
and psychological well-being of child abuse victims. It relied both on its
prior decisions and additional scientific authority on the “psychological
trauma suffered by child abuse victims who must testify in court” to
uphold the Maryland statute. Furthermore, the scientific database
identified by Justice O’Connor cited in Craig as a “growing body of

30.

497 U.S. 836, 840-41 (1990).
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academic literature” also supports the procedures upheld by the Court.31
There exist a range of situation-specific and child-specific variables
affecting the psychological impact of participation in criminal courtroom
proceedings on children. The constitutional requirement of
individualized findings of necessity by the trial court are consistent with
the variations among children and situations that result in variabilities in
the need for these modifications. Along similar lines, the Supreme Court
has incorporated up-to-date neuroscientific information about children’s
development into its most recent juvenile justice cases addressing
sentencing and custodial interrogation.
Children are engaged in a biologically driven and exceedingly rapid
process of maturation that is highly responsive to environmental inputs.
The experiences that occur throughout this process can have significant
and potentially lifelong effects on their functioning. These factors may
render children more vulnerable to potential harm, while also presenting
them with substantial opportunities for positive growth. Developmental
science, which includes psychological research, neuroscientific evidence,
and the findings of a range of health science disciplines, while unable to
answer many empirical questions, can inform others. To the extent that
the available data elucidate questions about children’s vulnerability that
must be addressed in a constitutional dispute, familiarity with such
findings by constitutional decisionmakers is likely to promote a
resolution more faithful to the underlying constitutional principles.

31. Id. at 852-57.

